Testing for Oligopoly and Oligopsony Power by Azzam, Azzeddine M. & Pagoulatos, Emilio
iJ,P. -Is 
ATE STRATEGIES,  PUBLIC POLICIES 
FOOD SYSTEM  PERFORMANC~ 
Testing for Oligopoly and 
Oligopsony Power 
by 
Azzeddine Azzam and Emilio Pagoulatos 
WP-15  September 1989 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
.".,-
A Joint USDA Land Grant University Research Project .' 
.' 
Testing for Oligopoly and 
Oligopsony Power 
by 
Azzeddine Azzam and Emilio Pagoulatos 
WP-15  September 1989 
The results reported are based upon an Experiment Station project 
concerned with the functioning of the Food Marketing System.  The 
paper has been written specifically as our contribution to the 
NE-165 project. 
The authors are Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Professor and Head, Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Connecticut. " 
TESTING FOR OLIGOPOLY AND OLIGOPSONY POVvER 
SUMMARY 
This paper extends the conjectural approach in industrial organization to the analysis 
of imperfections in output and factor markets simultaneously.  Starting from the speci-
fication of a  production function,  the econometric analysis is  based on the formulation 
and estimation of a simultaneous equation model consisting of a production function, first 
order conditions associated with factor  employment,  and two conjectural elasticities to 
parametrize the industry's oligopoly and oligopsony equilibria.  As an example, we provide 
an application to the U.S. meat packing industry.  Our results suggest that the industry 
excercised market power in both the output (meat) market and the factor (live animals) 
market. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent studies in applied industrial organization have popularized the use of conjec-
tural elasticity models to study market power.  Several studies have estimated such models 
(See Geroski (1988) and Bresnahan (1987) for a survey) but virtually all applications con-
sider market power in the output market only.  Only one (Schroeter, 1988) has considered " 
an industry in which market power is  exercised in both the output and the input mar-
kets.  From the standpoint of econometric estimation, inference of market power from an 
oligopoly / oligopsony model or an oligopoly model involves three sets of unknown param-
eters:  costs,  demand and firm  or industry conduct.  So,  construction of a  model with 
imperfections in both the input and output markets would involve a simple adaptation of 
an oligopoly model [such as Appelbaum's (1982), for example].  The problem, however, is 
that such adaptation is possible only if certain restrictions are imposed on the firm's cost 
function. 
Since  the cost  function  has  as  arguments  the price(s)  of the input(s),  deriving an 
expression for the conjectural elasticity in the factor market is  not straightforward unless 
the production technology is restricted to be of fixed proportions between the output and 
the oligopsonistically purchased input.  Consequently,  the conjectural elasticities in the 
imperfect output and input markets turn out to be identical since the oligopsonized input 
and output can be represented by the same variable in the profit function (see Schroeter, 
1988).  The problem with this formulation is  that identical conduct in the two markets is 
not an implication of oligopoly/oligopsony theory but a result of the imposed technology. 
The purpose of this paper is  to propose  an alternative empirical model to test for 
market power in both input and output markets and apply it to the U.S.  meat packing 
2 industry.1 Unlike Schroeter's model, the model in this paper is developed without imposing 
identical market power on the buying and the selling side of the market. To do so, we use a 
production function approach which a) allows all inputs to be used in variable proportions 
and b) allows the derivation of market-specific conjectural elasticities.  This enables us to 
provide a parametric test for the equality of market power on both sides of the market. Like 
Schroeter's study, the framework in this paper is applied to aggregate industry behavior, 
since detailed firm data on the inputs required for estimation are not available.  2. 
In the next section,  the theoretical model is  presented.  The estimating model and 
empirical results are presented in the third section.  Based on published testimonies to 
various congressional committes and previous research, our prior notion is that the U.S. 
meat packing industry exerts some degree of market power.  Moreover, we  suspect that 
market power exercised by the industry is  different  in  the two markets and that it  is 
likely be higher in the input (livestock) markets.  In contrast to the meat market, which is 
national in scope, the market for slaughter animals is generally within a few hundered mile 
radius (Monfort of Colorado v.  Cargill).  Our empirical results confirm these notions.  The 
hypothesis of identical market power in the two markets is rejected.  The average degrees 
of oligopoly and oligopsony power were found to be statistically significant. 
3 " 
2,  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consider the U.S.  meat packing industry in which  N  firms  produce a  homogeneous 
output using M  inputs. Let the jth firm's technology be defined by the production process 
f 
(1) 
where qj is  output produced (meat), Xlj is  the farm input (livestock), and Xkj, (indexed 
k=2,  ... ,M) represent nonfarm inputs. Furthermore, assume each firm exercises some market 
power in purchasing the farm input Xlj and in selling its output qj but is a price taker in 
the market for other inputs. 
Let  the (wholesale)  market inverse  demand curve facing  the industry in its output 
market be given by 
P = g(Q),  (2) 
where P  and Q =  2:7=1 qj are market meat price and total industry output, respectively. 
The market inverse supply function for the agricultural input is  given by 
(3) 
where WI  and Xl =  2:7=1 Xlj are market livestock price and total industry livestock input, 
respectively.  Denoting the price of nonfarm inputs by W2, ...  , WM, and assuming each firm 
4 is a profit maximizer, the problem for the jth firm is to choose Xkj, (indexed k=1,2,  ... ,M) 
so as to maximize profits ITj 
M 
ITj  =  Pqj - L WkXkj 
k=1 
for j=1,2,  ... ,N,  (4) 
subject to (2) and (3).  The first order conditions corresponding to this profit maximization 
problem are given by 
(5) 
aIT - 6- ~ -
_ 3  = P(l - 2)Jxl - wI(l + 2) = 0 
aXIj  T]  € 
aIT- 6-
_3 = P(l - 2)Jx  - Wk = 0 
aXk  T]  k  (6) 
or 
WI  =  (1 _ 6j )f  _  WI ~j 
P  T]  Xl  P  €'  (7) 
for k=2,  ...  ,M  (8) 
where  T]  ~G  is the absolute value of the price elasticity of output demand; 
€  aa
X1 
!!!l.XW  is  the market price elasticity of farm input supply; 
Wl  1 
6- 3  ~~  is the jth firm's conjectural elasticity in the output market; 
~j  a ax
1 
::..±..LXl  - is  the jth firm's conjectural elasticity in the agricultural input market; 
Xl]  1 
and  JXk  ;X9;j  is the marginal product of the kth input. 
5 In theory, the conjectural elasticities, Bj and ¢j, as shown in (7) and (8), provide useful 
benchmarks for testing for price-taking behavior or degree of competitiveness (Appelbaum, 
1982).  Assuming positive marginal products, if both B j  and ¢j are equal to 0,  we have the 
perfectly competitive case where each firm equates the marginal product of each input to its 
real price.  In the extreme case where both B j  and ¢j are equal to 1, we obtain the monopoly 
and monopsony case for the output and the farm input, respectively.  Other combinations 
of market structures can be identified:  monopoly in input markets and perfect competition 
in output markets (Bj  = 0 and ¢j = 1) or vice versa.  Alternatively, one can identify the 
location of the firm  on the continuum between the two poles of market structure as B j 
and ¢j can take on individual values between zero and one.  The ratio of the conjectural 
elasticities to the demand and supply elasticities measure the degree of market power in 
the output and input market, respectively. 
In practice,  the absence  panel data on firm  level  output and employment levels  of 
factors of production means that the system embodied in (7)  and (8)  cannot be readily 
estimated. This limitation leads us to consider the problem on an aggregate level.  In doing 
so,  however,  certain additional assumptions must be maintained to make the preceding 
analysis applicable to the behavior of the industry as a whole. 
The first assumption is that marginal products are constant and identical across firms in 
6 equilibirum.  This implies that any deviation from price taking behavior can be accounted 
for by the respective firm's conduct as reflected by the conjectural elasticities.  Absence of 
firm level data, however, prohibits estimation of conjectural elasticities for individual firms. 
Hence,  a  procedure is  needed to aggregate the individual firm's  conjectural elasticities. 
One procedure originally adopted by Appelbaum (1982)  is  to assert that all conjectural 
elasticities are identical across firms.  The problem with this assertion is that it is  not an 
implication of the theory as there is nothing in the logic of oligopoly theory to suggest all 
firms to have the same conduct (Bresnahan (1987), p.33).  A more tenable alternative is 
to use weighted averages of individual conjectural elasticities, where the weights are each 
firm's share in total input our output (also adopted by Cowling and Waterson, 1976).  For 
our purposes, this is  accomplished by multiplying equations (7)  and (8) by qil summing 
over firms, and dividing the result by total industry output Q.  The aggregate analogue of 
the optimality conditions, (7) and (8), may now be written as follows: 
WI  e  WI~  - = (1 - - )fx  - --,  P  7J  1  P€  (9) 
Wk  e 
- =  (1- -)fx  P  7J  k 
for k=2,  ... ,M  (10) 
where e =  ""f:l(1!i)8·  and  ~ =  ""f:l(I!i)A. .  The ratios  ~ and  ~ represent industry wide  UJ  Q  "  UJ  Q  'f'J.  T1  f 
indices of market power in the output and input markets, respectively.  the hypothesis of 
7 equal market power in the two markets can be stated as  8/77  =  ~  / €.  If the hypothesis 
is  accepted then a  test of price taking behavior will  entail testing the joint hypothesis 
8/77 =  ~  / €  =  o.  If  rejected, it is sufficient to test the equality of the respective indices of 
market power to zero.  The next section outlines the empirical model. 
3.  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
In order to estimate the model of industry oligopoly/oligopsony behavior developed in 
the previous section (equations 9 and 10), and test the hypothesis of price taking behavior 
in the meat packing industy, we need to select a functional form for the production function. 
It is  desirable that the form does not impose any a priori constraints on the production 
characteristics in the industry.  One function suitable for our purposes is the transcendental 
logarithmic production function (Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau, 1971). 
4  4  4 
In Q = 130 + L: 13k In X k +  1/2 L: L: f3kj In X k In Xj  (11) 
k=l  k=lj=l 
where Q =  red meat production. We further assume that in addition to the livestock input 
(Xl)' there are three competitively priced inputs in the meat packing industry: labor (X2)' 
capital (X3), and non-livestock material (X4). 
From equation (11), the marginal product for the kth input is 
for k=I,2,3,4.  (12) 
8 Substituting (12) into (9) and (10) and rearranging leads to the following system of k+l 
equations 
4  4  4 
lnQ =  (30 + L (3dnXk + 1/2 L L (3kj InXk InXj 
k=1  k=lj=1 
I+M  4 
51 = {  L  }{(31 + L (31j InXj} 
1 +  j=1 
4 
52  =  {I + M}{(32 + L (32j In Xj} 
j=1 
4 
53 = {I + M}{(33 + L (33j InXj} 
j=1 
4 
54 = {I + M}{(34 + L (34j InXj } 
j=1 
(13) 
where 5k  =  W};~k  (for k=I,2,3,4) is  the share equation for the kth input, M  =  ~, and 
L=  ~.  , 
The data used in the estimation of the system of equations (13) are annual aggregate 
time series for the United States meat packing industry from 1959  through 19823.  The 
variable definitions and sources are as follows: 
Q  =  Total U.S.  commercial red meat (beef, pork, sheep and lamb) production (million 
lbs.  carcass weight) obtained from various issues of Livestock and Meat Statistics. 
51  =  W~~!  is the cost of livestock input relative to the value of shipment constructed from 
Census of Manufacturers, various issues.  The proportion of material cost attributed 
9 to the livestock input is  published by the Census Bureau every five  years only.  For 
the periods between the census years, we  assumed the proportion of material cost 
that is livestock to hold for the years between the current and the previous census. 
S2 = Wfo~2  is  total labor wages  in millions of dollars relative to the value of shipments, 
Sources:  Census  of Manufacturers,  and Employment and Earnings.  Labor wages 
were calculated as the product of the total hours worked by production workers X 2 
and the production worker average hourly earnings W2  for  SIC2011  (meat packing 
plants). 
S3 =  W~~3  is  the value of capital input relative the value of shipments obtained from the 
Corporation Source Book of Statistics of Income.  The value of the capital input and 
capital cost were calculated following the procedure outlined in Gollop and Roberts 
(1979).  The capital input (X3)  is the sum of net depreciable and depletable assets, 
land and inventories.  The cost of capital (W3)  was computed by dividing the sum of 
interest, depreciation, and depletion expenses by (X3). 
S4 = WJ>~4  is  the cost of non-livestock material input relative to the value of shipments. 
The non-livestock  material input (X4 )  was  computed  as  the quotient  formed  by 
dividing the cost of non-livestock material by the price index of intermediate inputs 
10 in manufacturing (W4)  published in Statistical Abstracts, various issues. 
For empirical implementation, we  assume that the production function and the share 
equations are stochastic due to technical errors and errors in optimization, respectively. 
The errors are assumed to be additive and jointly normally distributed with zero  mean 
and constant variance-covariance matrix.  Since output and all inputs in the model are 
endogenous, the Iterative Nonlinear Three Stage Least squares (IT3SLS) technique was 
used to avoid simultaneity bias4 •  Finally, since the estimation of the conjectural elasticities 
requires estimates of the demand and supply elasticities, we followed similar empirical stud-
ies  (Gelfand and Spiller, 1987;  Gollop and Roberts, 1979; Roberts,1984), and introduced 
them exogenously 5. 
The parameter estimates of the production function and their respective standard er-
rors are presented in Table 1.  Of the fifteen  production function parameters, only the 
parameter b12  was not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The estimated aver-
age conjectural elasticities in the output and input market were .176 and .109, respectively. 
The estimated measures for the indices of oligopoly and oligopsony power were .461  and 
.681.  The hypothesis of identical indices of market power in the product and input (live-
stock) market is rejected at the 95  percent level6•  Examination of the individual indices 
suggest that market power is indeed higher in the livestock procurement market. 
11 Table 1.  Estimated Parameters of the Full Model 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Translog production 
function parameters  Estimate 
{30  -.014  .006 
{31  .804  .055 
{32  .038  .005 
{33  .052  .006 
{34  .128  .016 
{311  .199  .057 
{322  -.045  .015 
{333  .029  .005 
{344  .119  .020 
{312  .010  .009 
{313  .018  .008 
{314  -.127 
r
021 
{323  .094  .018 
{324  -.009  .004 
{334  -.013  .004 
Conjectural Elasticity Parameters 
Output market: 
0  .176  (.073) 
Input market: 
<P  .109  (.041) 
Indices of Market Power 
Output market: 
L  .416  (.031)a 
Input market: 
M  .681  ( .006)a 
aStandard  errors  were  calculated  with  elasticities  assumed 
fixed. 
12 4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to extend the traditional conjectural approach to the 
analysis of imperfections in output and factor markets simultaneously.  Starting from the 
specification of a production function, the econometric analysis is based on the formulation 
and estimation of a simultaneous equation model consisting of a production function, first 
order conditions associated with factor employment,  and two  conjectural elasticities to 
parametrize the industry's oligopoly and oligopsony equilibria.  Our results suggest that, 
for the sample period considered, the U.S. meat packing industry was not a price-taker in 
neither the output (meat) market or the factor (livestock) market. 
13 FOOTNOTES 
IThe U.S.  meat packing industry has often been at the center of controversy over 
conditions of competition in both its livestock procurement and wholesale meat markets 
(Nicholls; Yeager).  Recent concern about the potential exercise of oligopsony and oligopoly 
power by meat packers has grown out of a reversal that began in the 1970s of an earlier 
trend toward deconcentration in the market.  The four largest beef packers increased their 
share of the national market from  29  percent in 1972  to 45  percent in 1982.  The four 
largest firms  in hog slaughtering and processing increased their national share from  32 
percent in 1972  to 36  percent in 1982 (U.S. House of Repres., 1980).  The trend toward 
fewer  and larger firms  resulting from mergers and acquisitions has continued since 1982, 
suggesting the possibility that packers may exert market power over both cattle buying 
and meat selling prices. 
2 The paper by Schroeter (1988) used aggregate data for the beef  packing industry. Only 
one share equation for the labor input was considered.  As  a  consquence, the parameter 
estimates did not take into account the cross-equation restrictions implied by the theory.  In 
this paper, we consider four inputs:  live animals, labor, capital and non-livestock material 
inputs. 
3 The sample period was dictated by data availability.  The year 1982 is the most recent 
14 year for which census data is available. 
4  The estimation approach was also adopted in a similar study by Gollop and Roberts 
(1979).  A discussion of statistical inference from nonlinear estimation procedure is provided 
by Gallant (1987).  The exogenous variables used were the meatpacking wage rate, the price 
of capital, the price of non-livestock inputs, a time trend, the price of poultry, the number 
of animal units as of January 1st, and per capita income. 
S  The literature is  divided on the issue of introducing elasticities into the estimating 
model.  Some authors (Applebaum, 1982; Lopez, 1984) estimated demand equations jointly 
with the full system.  Others (Gollop and Roberts, 1979; Roberts, 1984; Gelfant and Spiller, 
1987) obtained elasticity estimates from extraneous sources.  In this study we  attempted 
to estimate the demand and supply elasticities jointly with the full model by specifying a 
wholesale demand function for meat and a supply function of live cattle.  Unfortunately, 
joint estimation resulted in a  Lerner index greater than one,  which is  inconsistent with 
theory.  To deal with the problem, we  estimated the supply and demand functions sepa-
rately from the full system and subsequently used the elasticity point estimates to be able 
to estimate the conjectural elasticities.  Per capita demand for output (Q) was specified as 
a function of the price index of total read meat, the price index of poultry (source:  Agri-
cultural Statistics, various issues),  and per capita disposable income (source:  Economic 
15 , ' 
Report to the president, various issues).  Supply of livestock (in millions of pounds) was 
specified as  a  function of the index or prices received by farmers for  meat animals, the 
price index of prices received for feed grains, and an index of the inventory of meat animal 
units (source:  Agricultural Statistics, various issues). 
6  The calculated X2  statistic is 5.21.  The critical value is 3.84. 
16 .  ' 
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